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Abstract
Automatic static checkers based on model checking, particularly SAT-based bounded model check-
ers, are used in industry, but they sometimes suﬀer from the scalability problem. Scalability can be
achieved with the notions of Design by Contract(DbC) and modular checking. However, modular
checking with DbC still have some problems. The method is insuﬃcient for handling pointers to
functions (function-pointers) which are abundantly used in C programs, defensive programming
which is widely adopted in industrial software development projects, and re-entrancy which some-
times occurs in programs using callback functions. This paper proposes a DbC notation for the
above problems and a checking method that uses behavioral subtyping to clarify the exact location
where an error occurs.
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1 Introduction
Model checking of C and Java programs has been extensively studied, and
some industrial strength tools are now available [1,2,12]. In particular, SAT-
based bounded model checkers [4,8,13] can ﬁnd subtle bugs. However, they
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suﬀer from the state space explosion problem, which results in them having
poor scalability. Users sometimes have to pre-process the program codes to
cut down its size before they begin checking with the tool. The resulting
witnesses of errors also need to be manually checked afterwards. A systematic
means of modular checking is desirable to overcome this problem.
Modular checking has been realized in the form of extended static checkers
[9,10]. These checkers use the notion of Design by Contract(DbC) [16] and
separate the program check into caller side and callee side parts. The behav-
ioral speciﬁcations of the callee function or procedure (called contracts) are
the key to making the separation. The caller side check uses the externally
visible behavior of the callee, and the callee’s procedure body can be checked
regardless of its caller; the check is done solely using the behavioral speciﬁca-
tions. Since the checked program is small, the scalability problem disappears,
but at the risk of generating spurious alarms. Furthermore, the re-entrancy
problem [7] manifests itself for certain programs because the analysis cannot
make use of the caller side information.
VARVEL, a SAT-based bounded model checker for C programs, combines
model checking and modular checking. It performs modular checking on top
of the model checker F-Soft [13]. The idea of introducing DbC to a program
model checker is not new. For example, CBMC [4] and Bogor [18] as well as
F-Soft provide two primitives, assume and assert. These primitives can be
combined to emulate behavioral speciﬁcations needed for modular checking.
However, VARVEL explicitly introduces such a DbC style, which means that
the tool automatically embeds the appropriate primitives corresponding to
a contract at speciﬁc positions in the source programs and conducts model
checking.
Furthermore, VARVEL provides advanced features to deal with DbC for
higher-order functions [11]. In C programming, higher-order functions are
emulated by using function-pointers. The capability of handling function-
pointers is mandatory for checking industrial C programs because they use
many function pointers.
In this paper, we illustrate how the model checker we developed (VARVEL)
can provide modular checking, i.e., modular checking with model checking. We
also discuss DbC for function-pointers and the case of defensive programming.
The code snippets in the paper are from source programs developed in industry
that VARVEL has been applied to.
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2 Background
Model checking constructs a ﬁnite-state automaton from the speciﬁcations of
the target system to be checked and exhaustively searches the state space to
collect the states satisfying a given property [3]. In general, model checking
suﬀers from the state space explosion problem.
Application of model checking to programs (modern model checking) has
further problems, such as handling data values, procedure calls and so on.
Finite-state automaton does not explicitly represent the procedure calls, and
many modern model checkers perform the in-line expansion of a sequence of
procedures. This makes the state space explosion problem worse and results
in poor scalability. Especially, performing the ﬂow-sensitive analysis of a pro-
gram additionally requires caller side programs, and the size of programs to
be analyzed at a time becomes huge.
Client program
x = ... ;
... ;
y = deposit( x ) ;
... ;
Procedure
unsigned int bal ;
/**
@invariant 0 <= bal && bal < MAX
*/
/**
@pre 0 < x
@post __return == bal && bal == __old( bal ) + x
@param[out] bal
*/
int deposit( unsigned int x ){
int result;
if( bal + x < MAX )
result = ( bal += x ) ; /* Success */
else
result = -1 ; /* Error */
return result ;
}
Fig. 1. Example of DbC Description
Extended static checkers [9,10] enable modular checking through the no-
tion of DbC [16]. These checkers divide the program check into caller side
and callee side checks. In DbC, the callee program Procedure has a pre-
condition PreP and a postcondition PostP . In the example in Fig.1, the
function deposit has a precondition (@pre), a postcondition (@post), and in-
formation about the variables to be modiﬁed (@param[out]) as its contract.
In the postcondition, the symbol __return denotes the return value of the
function, and the symbol __old( expression ) denotes the value of the ex-
pression at the beginning of the function. In addition, the global variable bal
has the invariant(@invariant). Programs are checked against contracts as
follows. On the caller side, the calling program ClientProgram makes the
execution state S satisfying PreP before calling Procedure without knowing
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how Procedure is performed. ClientProgram assumes that PostP satisﬁes
the execution state R after returning from Procedure. This is denoted as
S ⇒ PreP , P reP ∧ PostP ⇒ R (1)
On the callee side, the callee program Procedure executes the body of function
BodyP under the assumption of PreP and satisﬁes PostP as a result. This is
denoted with the notion of the weakest precondition by E. Dijkstra [6] as
PreP ⇒wp.BodyP .P ostP (2)
When the invariant is taken into account, it is denoted as
PreP ∧ Inv ⇒wp.BodyP .(PostP ∧ Inv
′) (2’)
Inv′ is the invariant after the function body was processed. Obviously from
(1) and (2), it is possible to check the calling program and the called program
separately; modular checking is performed and the method is scalable. A
further advantage of DbC is that it clariﬁes where the responsibility lies for
ﬁxing a defect. For instance, if S does not satisfy PreP , the calling program
ClientProgram needs to be modiﬁed.
A disadvantage of modular checking is that it does not perform the inter-
procedural ﬂow-sensitive analysis because it stops the analysis at the boundary
of the contracts and uses no caller side information. Therefore, modular check-
ing produces many spurious witnesses of the errors. Particularly, it does not
handle re-entrancy where a function of a module will be processed while the
other function of the module is processed. In addition, the expressiveness of
the contract notation has some problems, such that it does not handle higher
order functions (function-pointers in the case of the C language). Also, DbC
remains controversial to what should be denoted as contracts, especially for
defensive programming.
The notion of DbC is independent of underlying checking technologies.
Before the recent appearance of static checkers, programs were checked against
contracts by testing [11,16]. SAT-based bounded model checkers provide some
primitives (assertion, assumption, etc.) for describing user-deﬁned properties
and assumptions on the external environment of a checked program. DbC can
be introduced to SAT-based bounded model checkers by using the checkers’
primitives. VARVEL is based on the SAT-based bounded model checker F-
Soft [13].
3 Overview of VARVEL
As mentioned above, VARVEL is a source codes checker for sequential C
programs, and it is based on the SAT-based bounded model checker F-Soft
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Fig. 2. Processing ﬂow of VARVEL
[13]. Figure 2 shows the processing ﬂow of VARVEL. It accepts ANSI-C (C90)
compliant source codes as its input and performs the following procedures to
detect typical errors and violations of user-deﬁned assertions.
First, VARVEL transforms the input source codes into control ﬂow graphs
(CFGs). It simpliﬁes the source codes, for instance, by combining multiple
return statements of a function into a single return statement, converting a
for statement into an equivalent while statement. This simpliﬁcation com-
presses a variety of expressions from C programs into a subset of ANSI-C and
makes it easy to parse the source codes and to construct CFGs. During the
construction of CFGs, VARVEL adds three kinds of information. The ﬁrst one
is the implicit assumptions that supply the information on the external envi-
ronment, such as the values of the global variables, the actual parameters of
the entry function which is speciﬁed as the root of the call-tree, and the return
value of the library function whose source codes are not available at the time
of the analysis. The second one is the internal variables that are a program
counter identifying the location on the CFGs and monitored variables indicat-
ing the bounds of an array, the validity of a pointer, etc. The third one is the
internal nodes that are the monitoring nodes checking whether the monitored
variables have proper values and the error nodes indicating the occurrences of
errors. After the construction of the ﬁrst CFGs, VARVEL performs a static
analysis to decrease the size of the CFG. It removes the irrelevant nodes to the
error nodes from the CFGs, and performs a points-to analysis to determine a
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set of memory addresses potentially assignable to a speciﬁc pointer variable.
The results of the points-to analysis enables VARVEL to merge multiple CFGs
into one CFG through the function-pointers.
Next, VARVEL generates state transition and property formulas from the
CFG. The state transition is represented as a set of formulas. Each formula
denotes the next value of a variable from the current values of some variables.
A property is an LTL formula denoting the condition to reach the error nodes.
The tool converts these formulas into boolean formulas and passes them along
to the model checking engine, which then performs SAT-based bounded model
checking on the given boolean formulas.
Finally, VARVEL translates the model checking results into the original
source codes. A witness of the error obtained by the model checking is shown
as a call stack from the beginning of the entry function to the location where
an error occurs.
Providing the notion of DbC explicitly is unique to VARVEL. VARVEL
uses F-Soft’s primitives (assumption and assertion) to emulate DbC. F-Soft
provides these primitives for users to describe the external environment infor-
mation. The use of primitives by VARVEL varies according to the following
functions.
• Entry functions
• Library functions
• Other functions: functions within a function call tree, except the entry
function and the library functions.
Figure 3 shows the diﬀerence in usage of primitives. Case 0 is an example
source codes and Case 1,2, and 3 are the usages of primitives for Case 0.
__assume(...) is a primitive assumption and __assert(...) is a primitive
assertion.
Case 1: Entry functions. For the entry functions, each precondition
or invariant is converted into an assumption at the beginning of the function,
and each postcondition or invariant is converted into an assertion at the end
of the function.
VARVEL implicitly assumes that the variable such as the argument of the
entry function and the global variable, which comes from outside of the func-
tions to be checked, takes a special symbol referring to a non-deterministically
chosen value. Assumptions that are speciﬁed as preconditions or invariants
are applied after the implicit assumptions are applied.
Case 2: Library functions. The contract of a library function is asso-
ciated with its prototype declaration and is given to VARVEL. For the library
functions, each precondition or invariant is converted into an assertion at the
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Case 0: Sample source codes
unsigned int g = 0;
/**
@invariant g <= 1
*/
/**
@pre 0 < x
@post 0 <= __return
@param[out] g
*/
int foo( int x ){
int result ;
/* function body */
return result;
}
Case 1: Entry functions
int foo( int x ){
int result ;
__assume( 0 < x ) ;
__assume( g <= 1 ) ;
/* function body */
__assert( 0 <= result ) ;
__assert( g <= 1 ) ;
return result;
}
Case 2: Library functions
int foo( int x ){
int result ;
__assert( 0 < x ) ;
__assert( g <= 1 ) ;
result = __NON_DET__();
g = __NON_DET__();
__assume( 0 <= result ) ;
__assume( g <= 1 ) ;
return result;
}
Case 3: Other functions
int foo( int x ){
int result ;
__assert( 0 < x ) ;
__assume( 0 < x ) ;
__assert( g <= 1 ) ;
__assume( g <= 1 ) ;
/* function body */
__assert( 0 <= result ) ;
__assume( 0 <= result ) ;
__assert( 0 <= __return ) ;
__assume( 0 <= __return ) ;
return result;
}
Fig. 3. Example description of contracts
beginning of the function, and each postcondition or invariant is converted
into an assumption at the end of the function. Non-deterministically chosen
values are assigned to the variables to be modiﬁed before the postconditions
are converted. In Fig.3, the global variable g is speciﬁed to be modiﬁed by
declaration @param[out] g in Case 0. A return value is implicitly regarded
as modiﬁed in the function.
Case 3: Other functions. For other functions, each precondition or
invariant is converted into two primitives (assertion and assumption) at the
beginning of the function, and each postcondition or invariant is also converted
into two primitives at the end of the function.
4 Function-pointers
One of the problems we encountered in applying VARVEL to industrial pro-
grams is related to the function-pointers. In C programs, function-pointers
are language constructs to realize higher-order functions. They are frequently
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used in C programs, such as device drivers, event dispatchers, GUI frameworks
and so on.
In general, a higher-order function is one that takes a function as its argu-
ment or its return value. For instance, the following function f is a higher-order
function that takes another function as its argument and returns an integer
value and this other function takes an integer argument and returns an integer
value.
f : (int→ int)→ int
Likewise, the following function g is a higher-order function that takes an
integer argument and returns a function.
g : int→ (int→ int)
Functional languages that treat functions as ﬁrst class data must be able
to handle the contract of a higher-order function. There is an existing work
that introduces contracts to Scheme [11], but the contracts are checked at
run-time, as in Eiﬀel [16]. Our method diﬀers from the existing work because
it checks contracts statically.
A higher-order function is diﬃcult to check against a contract statically,
since the preconditions and postconditions of a callee function are not de-
cided until the address of the callee function is assigned to a function-pointer.
Modular checking divides a program into modules by regarding contracts as
boundaries. This makes it even more diﬃcult to use the source codes of the
callee functions in other modules.
Figure 4 shows an example source codes using a function-pointer. The
function delegate has a function-pointer comp as its formal argument, and
the function user calls the delegate with the address of a function comp as
the actual argument. delegate’s precondition comp != NULL indicates that
the pointer argument comp dereferences a valid memory address. In this case,
two actual arguments (calc and -1) of the delegate given by the user are
consistent with the precondition of the delegate, so the check at the calling
site of the delegate succeeds. A precondition of the calc, however, is violated
at its calling site through the function-pointer (*comp)(0) in the delegate.
One way to ﬁx this precondition violation is to explicitly deﬁne
the precondition and postcondition of the formal argument comp of the
delegate function. If the precondition is ﬁxed as in Case 1 of Fig.4,
the delegate(calc, -1) shows up as a defect. If the defect is ﬁxed like
delegate(calc, 0), it satisﬁes the precondition of the comp, but it still vio-
lates the precondition of the calc. Deﬁning only the contract of a function-
pointer does not solve the problem. In order to check C programs with
function-pointers, we need to solve the following problems.
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Case 0:
Source code with function-pointer
/**
@pre comp != NULL && n >= -10
@post __result > 0
*/
int delegate(
int (*comp)(int), int n )
{
int x ;
if ( n > 0 )
x = (*comp)( n ) ;
else
x = (*comp)( 0 ) ;
return x ;
}
/**
@pre n > 0
@post __return > 0
*/
int calc( int n ) { ... }
int user( int m ) {
return delegate( calc, -1 );
}
Case 1:
Contracts for function-pointer
/**
@pre comp != NULL && n >= -10
@post __result > 0
@pointer comp
@pre __a1 >= 0
@post __return > 0
*/
int delegate(
int (*comp)(int), int n )
{ . . . . . . }
Fig. 4. Example of Pointer to Function
• formal contract : How can we give a contract notation for a function-pointer
(a formal contract) and check the source codes using the function-pointer
against the formal contract.
• actual contract : How can we check the consistency of the contract of the
function called via the function-pointer (the actual contract) with the formal
contract.
4.1 Notation of Formal Contracts
We need to extend the notation of the contract to denote the contract associ-
ated with a function-pointer (a formal contract) for the following cases:
• when a (local or global) variable is a function-pointer,
• when a function argument is a function-pointer, and
• when a return value of a function is a function-pointer.
Some example notations for each of these cases are shown in Fig.5. The
keyword @pointer PointerName denotes the start of a formal contract, and
the subsequent preconditions and postconditions compose the formal contract.
In the formal contract, the symbol __aN (N=1,2,...) represents the Nth argu-
ment of a function called via the function-pointer.
A formal contract should be checked when a function call via a function-
pointer occurs. This can be achieved by inserting primitive assertions before
Y. Hashimoto, S. Nakajima / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 254 (2009) 105–122 113
Case 1: For variables
void bar( )
{
int x, y ;
int (*fp)( int ) ;
/*
@pointer fp
@pre 0 < __a1
@post __return == 0
|| __return == 1
*/
...
y = (*fp)( x ) ;
...
}
Case 2: For arguments
/**
@pointer fp
@pre 0 < __a1
@post __return == 0
|| __return == 1
*/
void bar(
int (*fp)( int ) )
{
int x, y ;
...
y = (*fp)( x ) ;
...
}
Case 3: For return values
/**
@pointer __return
@pre 0 < __a1
@post __return == 0
|| __return == 1
*/
int (*bar( void ))( int )
{
int (*fp)( int ) ;
...
fp = FUNCTION_ADDRESS ;
...
return fp ;
}
Fig. 5. Example of Notation for Formal Contract
the call and primitive assumptions after the call. Some examples are shown
in Fig.6.
Case 1: For variables
void bar( )
{
int x, y ;
int (*fp)( int ) ;
...
__assert( 0 < __a1 ) ;
y = (*fp)( x ) ;
__assume( y == 0 || y == 1 ) ;
...
}
Case 2: For arguments
void bar( int (*fp)( int ) )
{
int x, y ;
...
__assert( 0 < __a1 ) ;
y = (*fp)( x ) ;
__assume( y == 0 || y == 1 ) ;
...
}
Fig. 6. Assertions for Formal Contract
4.2 Consistency of Actual and Formal Contracts
The relationship between a function-pointer and dereferenced functions can
be interpreted as substitutability. Behavioral subtyping denotes that the pre-
conditions of the subtype satisfy the preconditions of the supertype and the
postconditions of the supertype satisfy the postconditions of the subtype
[15].
Presub ⇒ Presuper
Postsub ⇐ Postsuper
We propose the use of behavioral subtyping for the formal argument compf
and actual argument compa of a function-pointer.
PreCompf ⇒ PreCompa
PostCompf ⇐ PostCompa
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The consistency between a formal contract and an actual contract can be
checked by using an automatic decision procedure or a theorem prover such
as Simplify [5]. In the case in Fig.4, Simplify gives x==0 as a counter-example
of behavioral subtyping for the formulas in Fig.7. Predicates comp_f_pre
and comp_a_pre respectively denote the preconditions of the formal argu-
ment compf and the actual argument compa. The formula starting with
FORALL(x) checks the behavioral subtyping rule for the preconditions.
(DEFPRED (comp_f_pre a1) (<= 0 a1))
(DEFPRED (comp_a_pre n) (< 0 n))
(FORALL (x)
(IMPLIES (comp_f_pre x) (comp_a_pre x))
)
Fig. 7. Formulas for Simplify
4.3 Dynamic Link Library
An explicit description of the contract for a local function-pointer is useful in
some cases. Figure 8 is an example of a program calling a library function
dynamically loaded and linked at run-time. The function foo assigns the
address returned by a function dlsym to the function-pointer comp and calls
the function f through the pointer. In order to check foo against its contract,
it is necessary to describe the (preconditions and) postconditions of comp;
otherwise, (*comp) returns the arbitrary value and the postcondition of foo
is violated.
/**
@post 0 <= __return
*/
int foo( int n ) {
int (*comp)( int ) ;
/*
@pointer comp
@pre 0 < __a1
@post 0 < __return
*/
int x ;
void *h = dlopen( "x.so", RTLD_LAZY ) ;
comp = ( int (*)( int ) ) dlsym( h, "f" ) ;
x = (*comp)( n ) ;
dlclose( h ) ;
return x - 1 ;
}
Fig. 8. Dynamic Link Library
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5 External and Internal Speciﬁcations
Another problem we sometimes encountered is what we specify as functions’
contracts. We may give contracts in an adequate manner depending on how
we use them. Contracts of the function deﬁne its speciﬁcation. An external
speciﬁcation is determined from the functional design, while an internal spec-
iﬁcation is from the implementation policy regarding the non-functionality,
such as the robustness.
Defensive programming is a technique for achieving robustness, and it has
been used in many industrial software development projects. Programmers
write as many checking codes for the invalid arguments as possible. From the
viewpoint of the design or functionality, the contract of a function is an ex-
ternal speciﬁcation of its intrinsic functionality to the other functions. In this
sense, the contract of a function should not accept invalid arguments because
they result in the function returning just an error code without performing its
intrinsic functionality.
From the viewpoint of the implementation or robustness, the contract of a
function is an internal speciﬁcation describing all the behaviors of the function.
In this sense, the contract of a function might accept any actual argument and
the function should check its validity to defend the intrinsic processing from
erroneous situations.
Case 0: Sample source codes
/* Returns absolute value of *p */
int bar( int *p ){
/* for robustness */
if ( p == NULL ) return -1;
/* for intrinsic functionality */
if ( 0 <= *p ) return *p ;
else return -(*p) ;
}
Case 1: Contracts for functionality
@pre p != NULL
@post __return >= 0
Case 2: Contracts for robustness
(defensive programming)
@post p != NULL --> __return >= 0
&& p == NULL --> __return == -1
Case 3: Contracts for
precise implementation
@pre p != NULL
@post 0 <= __return
@warning
@pre p == NULL
@post __return == -1
Fig. 9. Example of Defensive Programming
Figure 9 shows an example of the defensive programming technique. In the
example source codes (Case 0), a function bar checks the value of an argument
p for robustness. If p is NULL, bar returns a -1 (which is not an absolute
value) to notify the callers that something wrong happened. Otherwise, bar
calculates the absolute value of the variable dereferenced by pointer p and
returns the calculated result. Case 1 is an example of a external contract
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that represents an external speciﬁcation for the intrinsic functionality. The
precondition @pre denotes that callers must not pass NULL to bar in order for
bar to perform its intrinsic functionality. Case 2 is an example of a internal
contract that represents an internal speciﬁcation for defensive programming.
No precondition indicates that bar accepts any actual argument, and the
postcondition @post denotes the result for each case of an actual argument.
If p is not NULL, bar returns a non-negative value. If p is NULL, bar returns a
-1. Here, the symbol --> denotes logical implies. Functions calling bar must
judge whether the intrinsic functionality has been performed or not from the
return value of bar.
As for the callee side check, the contract in Case 2 of Fig.9 gives more pre-
cise information than that in Case 1, and is suitable for checking the function
bar itself. As for the caller side check, the choice of whether to choose Case
1 or 2 depends on the programming policy. A software development project
may adopt a policy to check the actual arguments of the functions before
calling them and chooses the contract in Case 1 for static checkers. Another
project may adopt a policy to check the return value of the functions without
checking their actual arguments and chooses the contract in Case 2. Hence, it
is preferable to describe both contract types so that programmers can choose
the type of contract for static checkers.
Case 3 in Fig.9 is an idea for the notation to represent both contracts from
Case 1 and 2 by distinguishing the intrinsic functionality and robustness. @pre
and @post after @warning are the additional precondition and postcondition
for the robustness.
External and internal contracts can be handled with the help of behavioral
subtyping. The relationships below should be respected for the consistency of
the external and internal contracts as mentioned in the section 4.2. Namely,
the internal contracts that represent all behaviors of a function correspond to
supertype and the external contracts that are specialized for behaviors of its
intrinsic functionality correspond to subtype.
Preexternal ⇒ Preinternal
Postexternal ⇐ Postinternal
The contracts in Case 3 of Fig.9 are translated as
Preexternal = (p = NULL)
Postexternal = (0 ≤ return)
Preinternal = ((p = NULL) ∨ (p = NULL)) = true
Postinternal = ((p = NULL) ⇒ (0 ≤ return))∧
((p = NULL) ⇒ ( return = −1)).
When the implementation of a function is checked, its internal contract
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should be used. Otherwise, part of the defensive programming becomes dead
code for the static checkers. In Fig.9, return -1; is dead code under the as-
sumption p != NULL. Indeed, in our trial using industrial programs, VARVEL
missed an error within the defensive programming part, because it could not
reach the error under the assumption of a external precondition speciﬁed by
the programmer.
When the usage of a function by other functions is checked, the choice
of contract to be used is up to the users of the static checkers. This means
the static checkers should provide an option to check the program against the
external or internal contracts.
6 Handling Re-Entrancy Problem
The use of function-pointers sometimes causes re-entrancy, which, in turn, can
manifest new problems related to the following points.
• Lack of global information
• Scope of invariant
Modular checking with the notion of DbC inherently checks one function
at a time. It lacks global information along a sequence of function calls, and
this can lead to an incorrect result, such as skipping an invariant violation.
In an object-oriented language such as Java, language constructs can be
used to deﬁne the scope of the invariants. For instance, in JML [14], the
scope of the invariants written in a given class is an object of the class, and
the invariants are evaluated at the beginning and end of the methods of the
object. C is a procedural language and does not have a language construct like
Java’s class for grouping variables and functions. The scope of the invariants
in C is usually global and they must be held at the beginning and end of all
the functions.
Figure 10 shows example source codes similar to Subject-Observer pattern
[7] to better explain the problem. The function test in ﬁle test.c starts a
function call sequence. It ﬁrst passes the address of function Subject_Get in
a subject.c ﬁle to function Observer_Init in a observer.c ﬁle and then
calls function Subject_Update in subject.c with an actual argument -10.
Observer_Init assigns the Subject_Get address to a global variable pGet,
which is a function-pointer. Subject_Update assigns its argument -10 to a
global variable state, calls function Observer_Notify in observer.c, and
assigns a 0 to a state to satisfy the invariant state >= 0. Thus, the in-
variant state >= 0 is violated during the processing of Observer_Notify,
which calls back Subject_Get through the pointer pGet. At the beginning of
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Subject_Get, the state value is -10 and the invariant state >= 0 is violated.
subject.c
int state = 0 ;
/**
@invariant state >= 0
*/
int Subject_Get() {
return state ;
}
void Subject_Update( int i ) {
state = i ;
Observer_Notify() ;
if ( state < 0 )
state = 0 ;
}
observer.c
static int (*pGet)( ) ;
static int cache = 0 ;
void Observer_Init( int (*pFunc)( ) ) {
pGet = pFunc ;
}
void Observer_Notify( ) {
cache = (*pGet)( ) ;
}
test.c
void test() {
Observer_Init( Subject_Get ) ;
Subject_Update( -10 ) ;
}
Fig. 10. Example of Re-Entrancy
To perform modular checking on subject.c, a tool checks Subject_Get
and Subject_Update separately and it seems impossible to ﬁnd the invariant
violation previously described, since the context of the sequence from the
test is not given to it. Instead, the tool warns the invariant violation at the
calling point of Observer_Notify since it regards the scope of the invariant
state >= 0 as global and evaluates the invariant at the beginning and end of
all the functions.
We need the following features to check C programs against invariants in
the re-entrancy situation.
• Use of information beyond the module boundary.
• The resolution of an actual function dereferenced by a function-pointer.
• A ﬁle-scoped invariant.
Use of Information beyond the Module Boundary SAT-based
bounded model checkers including F-Soft perform in-line expansion of all func-
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subject.c : Declaration of ﬁle-scoped invariant
int state = 0 ;
/**
@file_invariant state >= 0
*/
subject.c : Realization of ﬁle-scoped invariant with assumptions, etc.
int Subject_Get() {
int r ;
__assert( state >= 0 ) ;
__assume( state >= 0 ) ;
r = state ;
__assert( state >= 0 ) ;
__assume( state >= 0 ) ;
return r ;
}
void Subject_Update( int i ) {
__assert( state >= 0 ) ;
__assume( state >= 0 ) ;
state = i ;
Observer_Notify() ;
if ( state < 0 )
state = 0 ;
__assert( state >= 0 ) ;
__assume( state >= 0 ) ;
}
Fig. 11. Example of File-scoped Invariant
tions into one big function. By their nature, such checkers can use source codes
information beyond the contract, that is the module boundary. VARVEL can
make use of such features provided by F-Soft.
Resolution of Actual Function The re-entrancy in C programs is often
caused by a function call through a function-pointer. F-Soft performs a points-
to analysis to determine the set of function addresses that are potentially
assignable to a function-pointer and constructs a proper CFG in consideration
of the function-pointers. VARVEL can make use of such features provided by
F-Soft.
File-scoped Invariant Checking the invariants at the beginning and end
of all the functions accessible from a static checker cannot detect the invari-
ant violation at the location of re-entrance, because the checker detects the
invariant violation at other locations before the re-entrance occurs and hides
the invariant violation at re-entrance. Restricting the scope of the invariants
to a certain module is necessary. For the C language, one way to repre-
sent a module is with a ﬁle. To detect the invariant violation at re-entrance,
in Fig.10, the scope of the invariant state >= 0 deﬁned in ﬁle subject.c
should be restricted to subject.c itself. We call the invariant of which scope
is a ﬁle a ﬁle-scoped invariant. Figure 11 shows an example of the notation
of ﬁle-scoped invariants (@file_invariant state >= 0) and a realization of
ﬁle-scoped invariants by using primitives (assertions, etc.). The realization in
Fig.11 corresponds to Case 3 in Fig.3. The ﬁle-scoped invariants in Case 1 (en-
try functions) and Case 2 (library functions) of Fig.3 can also be achieved as
well. We experimented with the example in Fig.11 and found that VARVEL
can detect the invariant violation at the re-entrance location, which is the
beginning of the function Subject_Get.
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7 Discussions
As mentioned in sections 4,5, and 6, a SAT-based bounded model checker sup-
porting modular checking can overcome the weakness in modular checking if
we adopt the notion of behavioral subtyping [15] and enhance DbC notations.
However, it needs to consider other aspects for a practical use of the tool. The
explanations are in order.
Initialization for invariants. The invariants are met after the initial-
ization is completed. Object oriented languages like C++ and Java have a
constructor, which is a language construct for initialization. C dose not have a
constructor and the initializer of the variable declaration in C is not expressive
enough to initialize the variables with complex data structures. C program-
mers usually write their own initialization functions. DbC notations must be
enhanced to instruct the static checkers about the initialization function.
Scope of invariants for header ﬁle. Section 6 explained the scope
of the invariants for implementation ﬁles (”.c”). In the case of header ﬁles
(”.h”), there are at least two interpretations of the ﬁle scope. The ﬁrst is
to check the invariants deﬁned in a header ﬁle at the beginning and end of
the functions declared in the same header ﬁle. The second is to check the
invariants deﬁned in a header ﬁle at the beginning and end of the functions
deﬁned in the implementation ﬁles that include the header ﬁle. Clariﬁcation
of the relationship between the logical modules and physical containers (ﬁles,
directories and run-time modules) might lead us to a better choice.
It is not easy to solve the above issues by considering only the syntax
and semantics of C language. We need to more thoroughly understand
programming convention currently in practical use; how developers write
industrial source codes (defensive programming, etc.) and how they create
logical modules using language constructs and physical containers. We plan
to establish a convention so that the advanced checking discussed above can
also be performed by VARVEL.
8 Conclusion
This paper primarily discussed the handling of function-pointers. Although
the importance of properly handling function-pointers is well known for the
automatic checking of C programs, there are very few checkers that can actu-
ally handle them. VARVEL, a SAT-based bounded model checker supporting
DbC [16], could be the tool for handling the function-pointers in the modular
checking of C programs. We showed how function-pointers can be handled by
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taking advantage of the notion of behavioral subtyping [15] in example source
codes of industrial C programs to which VARVEL has already been applied.
In the future, we will examine the practical conventions of programming
and incorporate what we learn into the enhancements to DbC notations and
VARVEL.
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